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ABSTRACT

The labor mobility demonstration project attempted to increase the geographic mobility of a population characterized by low previous mobility and low mobility potential--black and white workers, either unemployed or newly trained (Manpower Development Training Act) from central Alabama. The complexity of the recruitment and selection task, and substantial slippage resulting from sloppy recruitment procedures and the fact that the staff attempted local as well as non-local placements, are revealed in the fact that only 202 of 279 persons interviewed actually reported to potential relocation jobs. Firm offer of a job appropriate to skills and expectations, i.e., careful job development, as well as a minimum of bureaucratic snarls in the funding process, were crucial in effecting successful relocation. By time of interview all but 51 of 152 actual relocatees had returned home, most because of layoff or anticipated layoff, emphasizing the crucial role of job duration in successful relocation. Regression analysis indiated that relocation success was associated with two principal explanatory variables: appropriate job availability and prior skill training. (Author)

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LABOR RELOCATION ASSISTANCE: THE ALABAMA EXPERIENCE

A CASE-STUDY OF THE TUSKEGEE INSTITUTE LABOR MOBILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

1965-66 and 1966-67

by

Kathleen Mary McElroy

Final Report

of a
study for the

U. S. Department of Labor
Manpower Administration

Case-Western Reserve University
Cleveland, Ohio

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October 1, 1974

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Tuskegee Institute operated an experimental Labor Mobility Demonstration Project (LMDP) out of the center of the Black Belt of Alabama, a rural area with a surplus of underemployed and unskilled farm labor. The LMDP recruited and provided relocation assistance for newly-graduated MDTA trainees; rural, unskilled unemployed; and a few unemployed skilled or semi-skilled Alabama workers. Through recruitment and selection, job placement, financial aid for relocation, and the minimal provision of selected supportive services the Tuskegee LMDP staff attempted to reduce relevant cost barriers and increase the geographic mobility of a population characterized by low previous mobility and low mobility potential. In addition, the Tuskegee staff apparently acted to supplement the placement activities of the Alabama State Employment Service, since most MDTA trainees seeking placement help were black workers attempting to secure access to those entry-level craft jobs traditionally reserved for white workers in the South.

The following are the findings concerning the project and the implications related to them:

Interviews with 279 of the 450 purported relocatees 6 months to 2 years after relocation revealed that only 202 actually reported to potential relocation jobs--reflecting the complexity of the recruitment and selection task and the substantial slippage resulting from sloppy recruitment procedures and the fact that the staff attempted local as well as non-local placements.

Fifty of these 202 potential relocatees were not hired or did not take the relocation job and returned home immediately--suggesting that a firm offer of a job appropriate to skills and expectations, i.e. careful job development, as well as a minimum of bureaucratic snarls in the relocation funding process, are crucial in facilitating successful relocation of the rural unemployed.

By the time of interview 101 of the 152 actual relocatees had returned home, most because of layoff or anticipated layoff--revealing the crucial role of job duration in successful relocation and emphasizing the fact that if forced onto their own job search processes soon after arrival in a new labor market, these semi-skilled workers invariably returned home.

The 51 successful relocatees exhibited a lower unemployment rate, higher income, a more desirable occupational distribution, and residence in more lively labor markets than did the group that returned home or the control group. We note however that of those who even attempted relocation only one fourth were successful. This suggests that this relocation process badly needed more practical bureaucratic incentives and an administrative funding system that rewarded long-term placements.

Regression analysis revealed the crucial role of two factors in insuring relocation success which are amenable to policy control: appropriate job availability at the relocation site and, for numerous reasons, prior skill training. In addition, this study suggests that aggressive job development and placement for minority groups may well be best pursued by independent contractors uniquely sensitive to the group's needs yet integrated into a more comprehensive manpower services delivery system.

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16. Abstracts This LMDP attempted to increase the geographic mobility of a population characterized by low previous mobility and low mobility potential--black and white workers, either unemployed or newly trained (MDTA) from central Alabama. The complexity of the recruitment and selection task, and substantial slippage resulting from sloppy recruitment procedures and the fact that the staff attempted local as well as non-local placements, are revealed in the fact that only 202 of 279 [illegible]ons interviewed actually reported to potential relocation jobs. Firm offer of a [illegible] appropriate to skills and expectations, i.e. careful job development, as well as a minimum of bureaucratic snarls in the funding process, were crucial in effecting successful relocation. By time of interview all but 51 of 152 actual relocatees had returned home, most because of layoff or anticipated layoff, emphasizing the crucial role of job duration in successful relocation. Regression analysis indicated that relocation success was associated with two principal explantory variables: appropriate job availability and prior skill training.

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INTRODUCTION

Human capital theory, that refinement of the traditional maximizing theory of which labor economists are currently enamored, suggests that migration in response to economic incentives may be selective, sluggish, or perverse as measured either by individual welfare or total societal welfare. For information gathering (concerning job availability, job characteristics, and location externalities), necessary complementary skill acquisition, and migration are all costly activities--each with its monetary and non-monetary costs. In assuming any (or all) of these costs a worker anticipates uncertain benefits. This is particularly the case as regards geographic mobility for the blue-collar worker, whose usual job market information source is his peer group. Theory suggests therefore that any of the above costs may inhibit or misdirect geographic mobility. And the risk-taking in response to the vaguely perceived economic benefits which may result from relocation will differ according to the demographic characteristics and the occupational classification of the worker. The consequent selective response to market incentives may lead to sluggish geographic mobility and consequently to depressed areas characterized by precisely those workers for whom investment in migration would have relatively less pay-off--older workers, uneducated workers, unskilled workers.

Empirical research generally concludes that the direction of migration in this country has been economically rational and responsive to geographic labor market incentives--if we consider "rational" to be the pursuit of maximum net advantage as represented by higher rather than lower income, or greater rather than lesser job opportunity. And the amount of migration has been substantial. But as suggested by human capital theory, migration has indeed been selective, and the correlates of geographic labor mobility in the last several decades are well known and well documented: the younger do move more readily than the older and the more highly educated and highly skilled have higher migration rates than do their less educated and less skilled counterparts. In addition, geographic mobility is greater for men than women and for whites than blacks. In spite of generally high levels of geographic mobility, therefore, the United States exhibits areas of relatively high unemployment which have not been eliminated by migration of members of the labor force in response to apparent market incentives. And these areas are characterized by precisely those workers from whom we can expect at best sluggish geographic mobility. In addition, the post-war flow of workers into congested urban centers (which are the relatively higher wage areas) has added to the problems of urban congestion, further burdened municipal services, and increased the unemployment rates for the low-skilled in these areas.

Impelled by a severe post-war labor shortage, as well as by the existence of regions of relatively higher unemployment, most European nations have embraced elaborate manpower assistance strategies, based on the Swedish model. These nations report successful though limited experience with government aided relocation to speed migration from depressed areas and direct it to regions of relatively greater labor demand.

Favorable reports concerning the European use of relocation assistance, along with persistent pockets of relatively high unemployment in depressed areas in this country, rightly led in the early 1960's to proposals that relocation aid be included among the manpower services made available to selected members of the U.S. labor force. Enactment of such assistance appears to have met two major barriers: the politically influential proposition that the appropriate solution to depressed areas was their redevelopment (an argument actualized in the Area Redevelopment Act); and the apparent political opposition of congressmen from depressed areas who feared wholesale relocation of their constituents and therefore the elimination of their districts. As a result, mobility assistance has been enacted in this country only in an experimental form: the Labor Mobility Demonstration Projects (LMDP), authorized by a 1963 amendment to the Manpower Development and Training Act.

THE TUSKEGEE INSTITUTE
LABOR MOBILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

Origins

The focus of this investigation is the Labor Mobility Demonstration Project that Tuskegee Institute in Alabama contracted for during the years 1965 to 1968. The Tuskegee LMDP operated out of the center of a geographic area known as the Black Belt of Alabama--so named for its rich soil type, but evocative also of the concentration of Alabama's black population in this region. It is an area characteristically rural, with a surplus of uneducated and unskilled farm labor. Median family income (1960 census) was $2101; 31% of the families in the Black Belt counties had incomes of less than $1000 in that year. Median education level was 7.7 years. In comparison, for the country as a whole in 1960 the median family income was $5009, with only 9.9% of families with incomes less than $1000, while the median level of education was 10.6 years.

The official unemployment rate for the Black Belt in 1960, 4.9%, was no doubt deceptively low, concealing substantial underemployment in agriculture and failing to report those who had withdrawn from the labor market. The U.S. Department of Labor unemployment statistic for the

State of Alabama in 1960 was 6.3%, as compared with a national unemployment rate in 1960 of 5.5%.

The Tuskegee LMDP recruited and provided relocation assistance for three types of workers: newly-graduated MDTA trainees; rural, unskilled unemployed; and a few semi-skilled and skilled Alabama workers who were underemployed or unemployed because of lack of demand for their skill speciality or because of discriminatory hiring practices. Through recruitment and selection, job placement, financial aid for relocation, and the minimal provision of selected supportive services the Tuskegee LMDP staff attempted to reduce relevant cost barriers and thus increase the geographic mobility of a population characterized by low previous mobility and low mobility potential. In addition, the Tuskegee staff apparently acted to supplement the placement activities of the Alabama State Employment Service, since most MDTA trainees seeking placement help from the LMDP were black workers attempting to secure access to those entry-level craft jobs traditionally closed to black workers in the South.

If one reads carefully the proposals and project reports for the Tuskegee Labor Mobility Demonstration Projects, one finds evidence of an imaginatively conceived and apparently correctly executed labor relocation program. One finds also, however, evidence of fundamental misunderstanding, as well as some dissembling, concerning the experimental and demonstration nature of these programs.

The first proposal, dated March 25, 1965, was for a LMDP operating out of Tuskegee Institute, and in conjunction with the Office of Manpower, Automation and Training (OMAT) retraining program currently being held at Tuskegee Institute. The proposal benignly describes the problems faced by black trainees, with new and imperfect skills, seeking entry-level jobs in largely rural, unindustrialized home communities and suggests the consequent necessity of aided relocation for these trainees--a function which, it claims, Tuskegee Institute is uniquely qualified to perform.[1] This benign representation of Tuskegee's role as merely an aid to the existing Alabama State Employment Service belies the racial furor created by the entry of black workers into Southern labor market occupational categories traditionally reserved for white workers. (At the time, trainees in the Tuskegee Institute OMAT program were being trained in brick masonry, carpentry, meat processing, and farm machinery repair.)

The origins of the Tuskegee Institute LMDP, then, while being unmistakably in part geographic (largely rural home communities), are equally properly understood by turning to an evaluation of the Tuskegee OMAT program done by the Bureau of Social Science Research, and particularly to that section of the report entitled "Job Placement and Development."[2] It seems best simply to quote extensively from that document, for it speaks eloquently for itself:

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[1] Tuskegee Institute, A Revised Proposal to Develop and Execute a Labor Mobility Demonstration Project, submitted by B. D. Mayberry, Program Director (Tuskegee Institute, 1965), p. 3.

> Under the terms of the OMAT contract the sum of $14,865 was to be paid to the Alabama State Employment Service for which their staff would develop jobs and place the trainees. The Tuskegee project had to assume this function for a number of reasons. (1) The State Employment Service in Alabama does not customarily engage in job development; its staff members merely refer applicants to openings of which employers have informed them. To provide better than the usual services to an all-Negro group might have provoked animosity in the majority group with which the service personnel was thought to identify. (2) Tuskegee Institute certainly had greater prestige and probably had more freedom and willingness to represent poor Negroes than any other agent in Alabama. (3) The project staff wanted to protect the trainees from exploitation, and it would have been awkward to intervene in a negotiation between employer and applicant which had been structured by the Employment Service.
>
> *The state did not accept the money or the responsibility which went with it.* [Italics mine.] We have been unable to document the extent of communication between the project staff and ASES at the state level. It is possible that informal conversations took place, but even this cannot be documented. We do know that the representative of the nearest local ES office first visited the project on June 11, 1965--at the end of training. At that time he was asked for aid in placing the meat processers and farm equipment repairmen. He demurred at revealing job orders, if any, in his files, recommended that the men register with the offices in their home communities, and suggested that the project address its request to Montgomery, the state office. The purpose of his visit to the project was to obtain placement information. [Footnote in

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[2] Louise A. Johnson, *Follow-up of MDTA Experimental and Demonstration Project Conducted by Tuskegee Institute* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., May, 1967), p. 64.

> text: "The visit took place in the presence of a BSSR staff member and does not reflect a second hand report."]
>
> The OMAT project began job development in the late spring of 1965. Staff members made a concerted effort in the short time remaining before the completion of training: they compiled lists of employers in the state; they contacted Tuskegee alumni; they asked for and received from the Georgia Employment Service a list of contractors in the area who were performing Federal Government contracts on which trainees might be employed; they also contacted the Columbia, South Carolina ES office; they ran their fingers through the yellow pages of communities throughout the state; they asked trainees to tell them about employers in their home areas who might employ them; they contacted the Urban Leagues in nearby communities; they made arrangements with contractors doing construction work on campus; they contacted other E & D projects reputed to have developed an excess of jobs; and, *they arranged with OMAT for a labor mobility demonstration project to relocate trainees.*[3] [Italics mine.]

Here then we have a rather different representation of the origin of and need for a pilot mobility demonstration project in Tuskegee, Alabama. No doubt both depressed home counties plus discrimination in traditional placement services provided impetus to and rationale for the Tuskegee project.

However, the Labor Mobility Demonstration Projects were not conceived primarily or solely as relocation services, and the early Tuskegee proposal seemed to recognize this in its specification that the Tuskegee LMDP would be "designed to provide information and analysis of problems created by or associated with worker relocation from a population of workers consisting of trainees from the Tuskegee E and D project as well as unemployed workers drawn from other parts of the State."[4] In addition, the proposal evidenced understanding of the complexity of the relocation process, the multiplicity of research and analysis goals inherent in an investigation of the mobility process, and an understanding of the supportive services needed.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

The proposal to renew the project for a second year is even more emphatic in its research emphasis. It reiterates as its objectives the ten objectives of the project specified in the first proposal, all of which are properly research objectives--for example, determining why workers may reject specific relocation job offers.[5] In addition, it adds such objectives as testing the efficacy of a thirty day trial period allowance in increasing successful relocations and testing the usefulness of one relocation agency in relocating trainees from the several MDTA training programs operating within Alabama.[6] All of this is in the context, of course, of testing whether a (black-staffed) private agency could operate successfully as a job development and placement agency simultaneously with the (white staffed and dominated) Alabama State Employment Service.

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[4] Tuskegee Institute, A Revised Proposal, pp. 2-3.

[5] Tuskegee Institute, "A Proposal to Develop and Execute a Labor Mobility Demonstration Project," submitted by B.D. Mayberry, Program Director (Tuskegee Institute, Alabama: Tuskegee Institute, March 9, 1966), p. 2.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 4 and 7.

This second project proposal demonstrates as well a continuing sensitivity to the complexity of supportive services needed in a relocation project. For example, it proposes this additional supportive service:

> Many of the rural workers were not accustomed to the rigor of industrial employment, especially in cases requiring close supervision. In too many instances they were hostile, non-responsive, and sometimes resentful with respect to on-the-job training by immediate supervisors. A much more vigorous job of pre-location counseling will help and, therefore, will be instituted. Through counseling, the whole range of employer-employee relationships will be explored and elaborated on for purposes of helping the relocatee to succeed on his new job. Special effort must and will be made to help MDTA trainees accept the fact that they are beginners rather than skilled craftsmen upon graduation. This can best be accomplished through counseling.[7]

Process

The operations of the Tuskegee LMDP, as reported in the proposals and final reports of the 1965-66 and 1966-67 projects, seem reputable and sound. While one finds an apologetic yet rationalized reference to the chaotic staff situation (evidenced in unqualified personnel with undefined responsibilities),[8] other aspects of the program are reported in a confident and occasionally analytic and provocative manner.

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[7] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[8] Ibid., p. 5.

Recruitment and Selection

In addition to testing the dynamics of the relocation process for MDTA trainees, Tuskegee Institute claimed that it could uniquely reach out to those most needful of relocation, since its various extension and adult education programs "extend to the most remote communities and most disadvantaged people in Alabama."[9] But the BSSR report, reviewing the experience of the OMAT retraining program operating out of Tuskegee Institute, suggests that reaching and including the most disadvantaged in any manpower program is a difficult task indeed. The BSSR report concludes regarding the Tuskegee training program:

> Although the trainees in this project were a deprived group of Negro men, the staff members acknowledged that they did not get to the people they most wanted to reach. Recruitment of the most deprived for retraining projects is a difficult task. The most needy either do not hear or do not come forward in response to conventional recruitment messages. The second Associate Director offered a prescription for recruitment at the end of the project year. He said he thought the hardcore could be reached only by going to the local county agents to inquire about the locations of the beer joints and the bootleggers. Then the recruiter should go to those places to get acquainted with the clientele. Over time, and in the course of repeated visits, he might hope to establish the kind of rapport that would lead to interest in a

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[9] Tuskegee Institute, A Revised Proposal, p. 3.

program such as this. Without such intervention he felt that distrust and inertia would preclude participation.[10]

This, then, was the experience of the OMAT recruitment and selection process. During the first year of the LMDP program (1965-66), half the relocatees were recruited from the OMAT training program--already admittedly not the target hardcore population. The rest of the relocatees were recruited "from the following sources and efforts:"

1. From the files of Tuskegee's [OMAT] E and D project. These were persons who applied too late (after program was filled), or who had some skill training already, or in several cases were on the waiting list for the next training program.
2. Those persons who were responding to the recruitment program for skilled workmen.
3. Referrals by local professional rural leaders, including Agricultural Extension Agents, Teachers of Vocational Agriculture, Rural Ministers, and indigenous community leadership, including relocatees drawn from other MDTA programs in the State.
4. Relocatees who found their own jobs.
5. Referrals from the Employment Service.[11]

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[10] Johnson, Follow-up of MDTA, p. 32. I have relied heavily on the BSSR accounts concerning recruitment and job development because they represent more eloquently, extensively and I think accurately than do the LMDP project reports my own perceptions during my stay in Alabama of labor market rigidities, subtle discrimination pressures, and hidden, virtually hopeless unemployment among Southern black people.

[11] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of the Labor Mobility Demonstration Project, No. 87-01-03, August 12, 1966, submitted by B. D. Mayberry, Program Director (Tuskegee Institute, Alabama: Tuskegee Institute, 1966), p. 6.

During the second year of the LMDP program (1966-67) about 80% of the relocatees were drawn from the federal retraining programs currently operating in Alabama or the twenty-seven state vocational and technical schools in Alabama, thus minimizing the recruitment problems and permitting a more accurate representation of skill level when approaching prospective employers.[12] The LMDP thus limited itself increasingly to those pre-selected for job training. Any hope for incursions into the economic world of the hard-core unemployed lay, therefore, increasingly in the recruitment and selection process at the retraining program level--a process deficient as already discussed.

The relocation selection process, as reported by the project, is unclear. The primary criteria for selection seem to be "trained, or had salable skills,"[13] as well as a willingness to relocate.

Job Development

The project reports demonstrate the imagination and resourcefulness required to find ("develop") jobs for potential relocatees. During the first year of the LMDP the staff reports that it tried various sources of job information: chambers of commerce, private employment agencies, personnel departments of large corporations, civilian personnel offices of military installations, business community leaders, businessmen's organizations, and direct dealings with small, private firms.[14] Once possible job openings were located, relocatees, represented as having entry-level qualifications, were brought for interviews--a seemingly simple process. But "due to lack of telephones among the rural people, and the slowness of the mail through General Delivery means, coordinating the interviews was time-consuming."[15]

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[12] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of the Labor Mobility Demonstration Project, No. 87-01-66-05. Contract Period: March 1, 1966, through April 30, 1967, submitted by B. D. Mayberry, Program Director (Tuskegee Institute, Alabama: Tuskegee Institute, January 15, 1968), p. 9.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

This first year of the project's operation included attempted relocations as far as Asbury Park, New Jersey, and Poughkeepsie, New York. The multiple difficulties of ensuring successful moves of this distance led the staff to propose that during the second year of its operation it would confine its job development and relocation activities to Alabama and other Southern states.[16]

By the second year of the program, job development had been refined into three approaches (approaches two and three admittedly seeming rather random):

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[14] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of the LMDP, No. 87-01-03, pp. 22-23.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[16] Tuskegee Institute, "A Proposal to Develop and Execute a LMDP," p. 5.

> 1. . . . discussing the applicant skills listed in the Tuskegee files with employment service officers in an effort to identify skill demand areas; when jobs are located by this method, no further clearance has been found necessary.
> 2. . . . the door-to-door process as related to industries and businesses having job possibilities for the skills in question.
> 3. . . . following up on hearsay and public communications media.[17]

Potential relocatees were again presented for interviews whenever the employer requested. The LMDP reports, however, do not suggest an aggressiveness comparable to that of the OMAT job development efforts, described below:

> If an employer indicated that he had even a single vacancy, three trainees were sent for the employment interview, accompanied by a member of the job development staff or an instructor. In every case the employer was given a choice from among several trainees. The staff member who went along was able to find out what qualities the employer considered most important as well as protect the trainees' rights to equal opportunity.[18]

This aggressiveness was probably desirable because often the black trainee was the first of his race in that particular work place. (It is well to recall we are discussing programs which took place almost ten years ago.) The LMDP could well have used a similar degree of aggressiveness in its own job development efforts.

Relocation: Funding

The process of funding the move of the relocatee and his family is virtually unintelligible for the first year

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[17] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-66-05, p. 14.

[18] Johnson, Follow-up of MDTA, pp. 66-67.

LMDP--I think because it was remarkably complicated:

> The files of the LMDP were divided into three departments: the "260 file" which included all initial interviews, the "955 file" of applicants for RAA, and the third file for routine correspondence and project materials. The Applicant Counselor and the Job Development Officer were responsible for the 260 File whereas it was the duty of the Relocation Officer to maintain the 955 records.
>
> When an individual applied to the LMDP for assistance, or when an initial interview was obtained, the applicant was placed into the active 260 files. A Personal Data Form was completed by the Applicant Counselor, and the process of reference checking was initiated. When the references were investigated and found to be valid, the applicant was cleared for final job developers to maintain awareness of all active 260 files, whether references were checked or unchecked.
>
> The procedure to provide financial assistance for relocation was immediately instituted when a job development officer reported that an applicant had been placed. The applicant was then moved into the 955 file where he became the responsibility of the Relocation Officer. The potential relocatee was then made a specific job offer. If the individual accepted, he was counseled as to the specific provisions of RAA and the significance of his decision to become mobile for economic improvement.
>
> In certain instances it was necessary to only partially complete the applicant's request for RAA until the employer's job certification arrived. When this form was received, the application process was completed.
>
> . . . .
>
> In cooperation with the Manpower Training Payment Unit, RAA forms were annotated to enhance their clarity. All special arrangements in transportation were noted, and it was indicated on the reverse of the ES-955 that all information was gained through personal interview (if such was the case). Furniture shipment and storage estimates, which were attached to the ES-956, were usually obtained by the Relocation Officer with the cooperation of the relocatee and area commercial van lines.[19]

The delays implicit in this complex procedure seriously compromised the ability of the program to effect an economic improvement in the lives of the people with whom it dealt. Under this system it took a minimum of a week to relocate these semi-skilled workers to jobs--during which time the job could easily be filled by someone else.[20] It is possible however that such complexity resulted in part from the fact that funding in this first year of the program was one half grant, one half loan.

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[19] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-03, pp. 28-29.

Things seem to have settled down by the second year of operation, and the funding process is described with some clarity.[21] In this year, all relocation assistance was by grant. If the staff report is to be believed, the relocation process proceeded as follows.

Once a definite job offer was secured, the potential relocatee was provided with a trial period allowance, funds for round-trip transportation alone to the new area and cost of living in that area until his first pay period. This initial period was expected to last thirty days. Dependents were provided with a family allowance during the worker's absence.

If employer and employee found the situation compatible, the family was provided with a relocation allowance, to move themselves and their belongings, as well as counseling concerning the moving and resettlement process---a rational scheme indeed.

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[20] Ibid., p. 29.

[21] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-66-05, pp. 16 and 19-22.

In twenty-six instances the second year project provided individual interview allowances, when an interview was requested by an employer. These funds were for travel and/or overnight accommodations, and totaled $216.45, or an average of $8.32 each. The following major costs were reported for the supposedly-relocated 347 individuals or families during the second year of the program: trial period allowances--$34,881.73 ($100.52 average); family relocation allowances (103 families)--$28,903.11 ($280.61 average).

The second year LMDP apparently was able to overcome the problem of the one-week lead-time mentioned above (between job offer and job acceptance) through judicious use of the trial allowance. It reports that the authority to provide that allowance permitted it to have workers on the job within forty-eight hours of the job offer.[22]

Relocation: Supportive Services

Although sensitivity was demonstrated in project proposals to the many supportive services required to successfully move a previously immobile population, not much is said about these services in the project reports. One suspects that this is because few such services were actually provided.

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[22] Ibid., p. 16.

One supportive service discussed at some length is the finding of adequate housing at reasonable price, lack of which was a major barrier to successful relocation in this as well as many other relocation schemes.[23] Project services seem limited to aiding in a market search, while the more imaginative approaches such as finding mobile homes as temporary (or permanent) housing were not employed.

Job counseling is also recognized as a crucial service. It is suggested as necessary to overcome the following demonstrated work adjustment problems:

1. Inability to accept close supervision.
2. Irresponsibility.
3. Failure to adjust to time clocks and the need to be punctual.
4. Inadequate respect for employer and fellow employees.
5. Monday absenteeism.[24]

It was the project staff's conclusion that lack of job proficiency led to far fewer relocation failures than did the work adjustment problems described above.

The relocation staff correctly perceived that their role permitted, as it was structured under the pilot LMDP, only short-term counseling and financing. They recognized the need for more comprehensive counseling, including but not limited to the following: "family budgeting, personal relationships, improvement of self-image, grooming, civic responsibility, and vocation counseling relative to work pride, employer relationship, punctuality, absenteeism, reliability and honesty."[25] Any relocation program which is integrated into a comprehensive manpower services system could be structured in such a way as to provide these and other services if it is agreed that they are necessary. And in fact the Tuskegee program in its second year of operation claimed that its staff "refers the relocatee to, and puts him in touch with, the employment service, the school system, and such private agencies as the church and community organizations" in the new community, as a matter of the standard relocation procedure.[26]

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Evaluation

Earlier we identified the cost barriers to geographic labor mobility and concluded that lowering these barriers will increase labor migration from depressed areas. As viewed from the perspective of economic theory a relocation program which functioned as described above should in fact lower selected cost barriers and ensure certain benefits for workers who engage in relocation.

A recruitment and selection process which identified and relocated the truly disadvantaged, underemployed, or unemployed worker would incur only small opportunity costs, since the earnings forgone during the travel and on-the-job training process would be minimal.

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[25] Ibid., p. 38.

[26] Ibid., p. 41.

Effective job development can overcome those information costs which seem to be crucial in inhibiting geographic labor mobility for semi- and unskilled workers: information concerning the location and availability of jobs with appropriate skill requirements at acceptable wage rates. Fairchild argues that conceptually job development and placement is actually a lowering of the real costs of information gathering and search.[27] The importance of this placement service cannot be overemphasized. As we shall see later, it was the availability of employment that was the most significant variable in our regression analysis of success or failure at relocation by the participants in the Tuskegee LMDP's.

Relocation can in some instances substitute for retraining and in doing so can minimize the human capital investment necessary to change a man's skills and thus his employability. By finding a job elsewhere appropriate to his skills we avoid the additional investment necessary to prepare him for job openings (if they exist at all) in the local labor market. (For relocation of low-skilled workers, especially those from the "rurals,"[28] Mangum concludes, however, that basic education and skill training will no doubt need to precede relocation.)[29]

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[27] Charles Fairchild, Worker Relocation: A Review of U.S. Department of Labor Mobility Demonstration Projects (Washington, D.C.: E. F. Shelley & Company, 1970), p. 73.

Financial aid in its various forms of course reduces the money costs of relocation--and with them some of the uncertainty and risk involved. We see above how various kinds of aid can finance diverse aspects of a relocation process: the exploratory (interview) trip, travel expenses, household moving expenses, and money to live on until the first pay check comes.

It is generally agreed that the strict financial costs of moving are fairly low---except, as Lansing and Mueller found, for middle-aged families who have accumulated substantial possessions. Their conclusions: "the direct cost of mobility is usually small. The average cost of $225 is not large absolutely. Also, it is not large relative to the income of the peole who move."[30] In his evaluation of pilot mobility assistance, however, Brandwein reaches an important conclusion concerning financial assistance: that by removing the financial risk of moving it helps crystalize moving decisions--a crucial function indeed.[31]

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[28] A Southern colloquialism, especially appropriate for our purposes.

[29] Garth L. Mangum, "Moving Workers to Jobs: An Evaluation of the Labor Mobility Demonstration Projects," Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts, III, No. 6 (1968), p. 14.

[30] J. B. Lansing and Eva Mueller, The Geographic Mobility of Labor (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967), pp. 258-59.

And so we come to the complex issue of psychic costs and their alleviation. Brandwein concludes that it is the non-financial services (job finding, counseling concerning job holding, housing and family adjustment) which are crucial in the successful relocation of those from rural areas with limited travel experience: "For [the rural worker] 'distance of move' is more a problem of cultural distance than mileage."[32] The psychic costs implicit in separation from familiar haunts and habits require inventive solutions, and the effective integration of the worker and his family into the new community requires, it appears, an array of supportive services of some subtlety and some complexity. Although it recognized them to be important, the Tuskegee project apparently did little to provide these services.

Benefits to the relocatee should accrue in the form of higher income, more satisfactory and satisfying working conditions, and the consumption benefits arising from a more desirable location of residence. The Tuskegee project, by its own report, apparently overcame many of the above cited costs and made the benefits of relocation available to its relocatee population. The project flatly reported: "Over the past two years, Tuskegee Institute has developed jobs for, and relocated, four hundred and fifty (450) unemployed persons."[33] And the one LMDP staff member to write an internal memo criticizing the project concluded: "The activities to get people screened, working, and relocated may lack the precision that a managerial specialist might like, but we get these jobs done."[34]

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[31] Seymour Brandwein, "Pilot Mobility Assistance Experience: Assessment and Recommendations," background paper for meeting of the National Manpower Advisory Committee, June 20, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Special Manpower Programs, Manpower Administration, Department of Labor, 1969), p. 5.

[32] Ibid., p. 6.

However, Robinson continues his critique as follows: "What we have trouble with is record-keeping, data analysis, and production."[35] And here we have evidence of a crucial misunderstanding by the LMDP concerning the experimental and demonstration function of the Tuskegee project. For it was this author's impression that while giving written evidence of sensitivity to the research aspects of the project (see earlier discussion), the staff really viewed itself as a relocation agency. The result was unreliable and often non-existent data on the process and results of labor relocation during these years 1965-66 and 1966-67. It is this author's opinion that the staff, or someone on it, was convinced that a continuation of funds from the Department of Labor (i.e. yearly renewal of the LMDP contract) depended primarily on the number of successful relocations accomplished (or at least reported) by the project. The fact that a failure could be as important as a success in testing and understanding the efficacy of subsidized mobility was either ignored or misunderstood.

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[33] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-66-05, p. 27.

[34] John M. Robinson, "My Personal Evaluation of Labor Mobility," prepared for B. D. Mayberry, Program Director, Tuskegee Institute Labor Mobility Demonstration Project, January, 1968, p. 3.

[35] Ibid. Robinson evidenced the same concern in an earlier report: John M. Robinson, "An Evaluation of M.A.C.T.A.D. Trainees in Fort Worth, Texas, December 27, 1967--December 30, 1967," private report submitted January 12, 1968, to the staff of the Tuskegee Institute Labor Mobility Demonstration Project.

As cited above, during the first two years of its operation, 1965-66 and 1966-67, the Tuskegee LMDP reported a total of 450 relocations. The project staff did report on the status of the 103 1965-66 relocatees at the time of the required two month follow-up: 61 remained on the original relocation job or in the original area.[36] By the second year only the total 347 reported relocations are discussed; no mention is made of what became of them after two months in the new area. It was at this point (1967) that the Division of Behavioral Science Research of Tuskegee Institute (DBSR), of which this author was a member, was employed by the Tuskegee LMDP to analyze the experiences of the 1965-66 and 1966-67 relocatees.

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[36] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-03, pp. 40-41.

Our task, as defined by the LMDP staff, was never very clear. We first understood it to be a mere summary and analysis of such relocation and two month follow-up data as existed in the LMDP files. (And perhaps this explains therefore the omission of any follow-up information in the LMDP summary report on its second year of operation.) But after perceiving the essential experimental and demonstration nature of the mobility project, the DBSR chose to attempt to secure follow-up information directly from each relocatee, via personal interview, concerning the relocatee's relocation experience and present labor market situation. Interviews were conducted six months to two years following relocation with the 279 respondents whom the DBSR interviewers could locate. (While this represents only 62% of the 450 relocatees, the interviewers actually did remarkably well in finding people who were generally difficult to locate.) A comparison of selected demographic and human capital characteristics of the sample versus the total group suggests that the sample is quite representative of the population in these characteristics (see Table 1, pp. 30-31).[37]

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[37] Unless otherwise noted, data in tables are compiled from DBSR interview information.

A proper evaluation of the outcome of this experimental relocation project would require either a carefully selected and matched control group or substantial and accurate pre-relocation labor market information (to do a pre- and post-relocation comparison). We have neither type of information. Therefore this case study generally compares the relocation experience and labor market situation of the 51 successful relocatees with that of two groups: the 101 who relocated and then left the relocation area before the interview; and the 127 who constitute our "internal control group," consisting of those among the 450 reported "relocatees" who took a job near home (37 individuals), did not report for relocation (40 individuals), and did report but took no job (50 individuals). (See Table 2, p. 32.)[38]

We define "successful relocation" in this study to mean residence in place of relocation until time of interview. The rationale here is that presumably relocatees were moved to smaller cities of more lively labor market activity than they might have chosen on their own, given what is known of that migration which is usual for the Southern black rural unemployed.

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[38] There were numerous possibilities and probabilities of data error in this study, beginning with whether we asked the right questions in the right ways--and whether we asked enough of them. Essentially, this is a question of measurement error. Our interviewers, though talented at finding this well-hidden population, were not systematically trained. (Some refused to ask questions which they felt

were embarrassing or demeaning.) Data from the LMDP files, when they existed, were of unknown quality.

Transforming raw data into numbers on IBM cards held many possibilities of error: although the codes were carefully drawn up by men skilled in survey research (but not labor market analysis or program evaluation), all the coding was done by Tuskegee Institute undergraduates--at least twelve different individuals. So whenever there was an item requiring some amount of judgment, one could find the same item coded quite differently. In addition, all key punching was done by Tuskegee Institute undergraduates and junior DBSR staff members without the use of a verifier. Although key items have been recoded and repunched for the purposes of the dissertation upon which this report is based, the reliability of each item of data as a correct measure of the relocation experience and current economic position of the LMDP participants is therefore somewhat questionable.

TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF TOTAL GROUP AND INTERVIEWED GROUP AT TIME OF RELOCATION

Characteristic	1965-66 Group				1966-67 Group				Total in Program 1965--1967			
	(1) Total		(2) Interviewed		(3) Total		(4) Interviewed		(5) Total		(6) Interviewed	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SEX												
male	101	99.0	60	98.4	295	85.0	180	82.6	396	88.2	240	86.0
female	1	1.0	1	1.6	52	15.0	38	17.4	53	11.8	39	14.0
RACE												
black	90	88.2	54	88.5	188	54.2	128	58.7	278	61.9	182	65.2
white	12	11.8	7	11.5	159	45.5	91	41.3	171	37.8	97	34.8
AGE												
15-19	11	10.8	4	6.6	[a]45	13.8	3	1.4	56	13.1	7	2.5
20-29	49	48.0	35	57.4	172	52.9	117	53.7	221	51.7	152	54.5
30-44	42	41.1	22	36.1	94	28.9	75	34.4	136	31.8	97	34.8
45 and over	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	4.3	23	10.6	14	3.2	23	8.2
EDUCATION												
0-8 grade	30	29.4	19	32.8	66	19.0	49	22.5	96	21.4	68	24.4
9-11 grade	30	29.4	18	29.5	91	26.2	49	22.5	121	26.9	67	24.0
12 grades	31	30.4	19	32.8	166	47.8	108	49.5	197	43.9	127	45.5
some college	3	2.9	3	4.9	18	5.2	12	5.5	21	4.7	15	5.4
unknown	8	7.8	2	3.2	6	1.7	0	0.0	14	3.1	2	0.7

TABLE 1--Continued

Characteristic	1965-66 Group				1966-67 Group				Total in Program 1965--1967			
	(1) Total		(2) Interviewed		(3) Total		(4) Interviewed		(5) Total		(6) Interviewed	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
MARITAL STATUS												
single or other	29	28.4	13	21.3	191	55.0	112	51.4	220	49.0	125	44.8
married	73	71.6	48	78.7	156	45.0	106	48.6	229	51.0	154	55.2
JOB TRAINING												
yes	61	59.8	43	70.5	299	86.2	154	70.6	360	80.2	197	70.6
no	41	40.2	18	29.5	48	13.8	64	29.4	89	19.8	82	29.4
EMPLOYMENT STATUS AT TIME OF RELOCATION												
employed	13	12.7	11	18.0								
unemployed	86	84.3	47	77.0								
unknown	3	2.9	3	4.9								

[a] Note that N=325 instead of the expected 347 for this category. As a result N=427 instead of 449 in column 5 for this category.

Source: Column 1--data cards supplied by the LMDP staff.
Column 3--LMDP staff tables, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-66-05.
Columns 2 and 4--DBSR interview data.

TABLE 2

THE TUSKEGEE ALABAMA LABOR MOBILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE DATA

1965-66	1966-67	Total
Attempted relocations by project staff 103	Attempted relocations by project staff 347	Attempted relocations by project staff 450
Project participants interviewed 61	Project participants interviewed 218	Project participants interviewed 279
Did not report 2 Took local job 3 Attempted relocation 56	Did not report 38 Took local job 34 Attempted relocation 146	Did not report 40 Took local job 37 Attempted relocation 202
"Internal control group" = 9 (14.7%) Did not take job 4 Took job 52 (85.2%)	"Internal control group" = 118 (54.0%) Did not take job 46 Took job 100 (45.8%)	"Internal control group" = 127 (45.4%) Did not take job 50 Took job 152 (54.5%)
At time of interview N=52	At time of interview N=100	At time of interview N=152
Left job and area 38 (73%) Still in area 14 (26%)	Left job and area 63 (63%) Still in area 37 (37%)	Left job and area 101 (66%) Still in area 51 (33.5%)

Hypotheses

In our case study of this LMDP we tested three hypotheses, the first of which was:

> Reduction of selected cost barriers to geographic mobility for the participants in the Tuskegee LMDP increased the rate of geographic mobility and improved the direction of geographic mobility for the participants.

Extensive examination of the migration literature in the dissertation revealed the generally agreed-upon correlates of natural geographic mobility. An examination of the total relocation population interviewed (N = 279) suggests that the LMDP selected a relocation population of mixed mobility characteristics: while the relocation population was overwhelmingly male and young, relatively highly educated, and characterized by an unusual degree of skill training (all correlates of mobility), it was also primarily black and married (correlates of relative immobility). See Table 3, p. 35. The population, moreover, was largely drawn from the poorer areas of Alabama and from areas from which there was relatively less natural geographic mobility, as measured by outmigration from state economic areas in the period 1965-70.

Those 202 persons interviewed who actually reported to a relocation job, and therefore "attempted relocation," exhibited mixed mobility characteristics similar to those of the total group. In addition, the mobility propensity measures which we have for this group attest to their general previous immobility (see Table 4, p. 38, and Tables 5 and 6, pp. 39 and 40, column 4).

Our measure of whether the LMDP increased the rate of migration for its participants is seriously impaired by the way the program operated concerning retrainees: workers apparently would be approached while still in training and asked whether they wished to accept subsidized relocation to a job in a new area. Thus we have no way of knowing if any of these workers would have moved on their own after completion of training other than our appraisal of their demographic, human capital and mobility propensity characteristics.

We do know, as discussed previously, that the LMDP staff claimed that it offered the following services to decrease certain costs in the hope of ensuring successful relocation: information, in terms of the location and availability of a definite job; financial aid, for interviews, trial relocation periods, family allowances, and finally moving expenses; and supportive services, such counseling and referral services as would minimize the psychic costs of leaving a familiar area and facilitate the integration of a worker and his family into a new community.

At the time of interview we found that 51 of the 202 who attempted relocation were still in the relocation

TABLE 3

THE TUSKEGEE ALABAMA LABOR MOBILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
PROFILE DATA

	Total Interviewed N=279	Attempted Relocation N=202	Successfully Relocated N=51
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS			
Race--Black	65.2%	71.8%	78.4%
Sex--Male	86.0%	87.6%	74.5%
Age--Median years	25 to 29	25 to 29	25 to 29
Married	55.2%	55.9%	39.2%
Wife working	34.4%	30.9%	40.0%
Black	24.4%	21.6%	37.5%
White	49.2%	50.0%	50.0%
Children home--Median number	2 or 3	2 or 3	2 or 3
HUMAN CAPITAL CHARACTERISTICS			
Skill training	70.6%	67.8%	66.7%
MDTA	84.3%	85.5%	85.3%
At Tuskegee	26.6%	29.5%	38.2%
Education--Median grades	12+	12+	9 to 11

TABLE 3--Continued

	Total Interviewed	Attempted Relocation	Successfully Relocated
HOMETOWN LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS			
Town median:			
size (1970)	10,000-25,000	10,000-25,000	25,000-49,000
growth rate (1960-70)	0 to -5.0%	-5.1 to -10.1%	0 to +5.0%
County median:			
employment in agriculture	3.1 to 6.0%	0 to 3.0%	3.1 to 6.0%
unemployment rate	4.0 to 4.9%	3.0 to 3.9%	3.0 to 3.9%
income as a % of Alabama median income (1970	70.1 to 90.0%	90.1 to 110.0%	90.1 to 110.0%
MOBILITY PROPENSITY CHARACTERISTICS			
Grew up on farm	49.1%	50.5%	47.1%
Living in hometown	64.3%	67.7%	70.6%
Lived in more than one community as civilian		43.8%	34.1%
Lived in other communities while in military		23.4%	13.4%
Median number of trips greater than 100 miles taken in previous 5 years		4 or more	3 or 4
Most relatives live near		70.9%	74.4%
Most friends live near		67.9%	62.9%
Have thought seriously of moving		73.1%	73.8%

Sources for Table 3

Hometown Labor Market Characteristics

Town size (1970) and growth rate (1969-70:

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), Part 2, Table 6.

Employment in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining as a % of total employed, by county and major city:

Calculated from U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 2, Tables 87 and 123.

County unemployment rate in year of relocation:

State of Alabama, Department of Industrial Relations, Research and Statistics Division, *Civilian Work Force Estimate, by County: Alabama. March, 1966* (Montgomery, Alabama, 1969); and State of Alabama, Department of Industrial Relations, Research and Statistics Division, *Civilian Work Force Estimate, by County: Alabama. March, 1967* (Montgomery, Alabama, 1969).

County median family income as a % of Alabama family median income (1970):

Calculated from U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 1, Table 186 and Part 2, Tables 47 and 127; and U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1962*, a Statistical Abstract Supplement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), Tables 2 and 6.

TABLE 4

MOBILITY PROPENSITY VARIABLES FROM DBSR INTERVIEW DATA

	Total Sample		Attempted Relocation	
	#	%	#	%
Did You Grow Up on a Farm?				
Yes	136	49.1	101	50.5
No	141	50.9	99	49.5
Total	277		200	
Are You Living in the Town Where you were Reared?				
Yes	178	64.3	134	67.7
No	99	35.7	64	32.3
Total	277		198	

TABLE 5

MOBILITY PROPENSITY DATA FROM LMDP DATA CARDS [a]

	(1) Successfully Relocated		(2) Left Relocation Area		(3) Did not Take Job		(4) Total Attempted Relocation		(5) Control Group	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Number of Communities Lived in as Civilian										
1	29	65.9	46	49.5	25	61.0	100	56.2	65	60.7
More than 1	15	34.1	47	50.5	16	39.0	78	43.8	42	39.3
Total	44		93		41		178		107	
Number of Communities Lived in While in Military Service										
0	39	86.6	63	70.8	29	78.4	131	76.6	76	80.8
1 or more	6	13.4	26	29.2	8	21.6	40	23.4	18	19.2
Total	45		89		37		171		94	
Number of Trips Greater than 100 Miles Taken in Previous 5 Years										
0	4	8.5	18	18.8	4	8.3	26	13.6	10	10.1
1-2	17	36.2	27	28.1	10	20.8	54	28.3	25	25.3
3-4	12	25.5	22	22.9	10	20.8	44	23.0	25	25.3
5 or more	14	29.8	29	30.2	24	50.0	67	35.1	39	39.4
Total	47		96		48		191		99	

[a] The N for all columns varies because of missing data.

TABLE 6

MOBILITY PROPENSITY DATA FROM LMDP DATA CARDS[a]

	(1) Successfully Relocated		(2) Left Relocation Area		(3) Did Not Take Job		(4) Total Attempted Relocation		(5) Control Group	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Where do Closest Relatives Live?										
All in hometown	3	7.0	13	15.9	10	23.3	26	15.5	16	15.0
Most in hometown	29	67.4	43	52.4	21	48.8	93	55.4	58	54.2
Few in hometown	11	25.6	26	31.7	12	27.9	49	29.2	33	30.8
Total	43		82		43		168		107	
Where do Closest Friends Live?										
All in hometown	5	14.3	12	14.3	6	14.0	23	14.2	12	10.6
Most in hometown	17	48.6	43	51.2	27	62.8	87	53.7	59	52.2
Few in hometown	13	37.1	28	33.3	10	23.3	51	31.5	35	31.0
None in hometown	0	0.0	1	1.2	0	0.0	1	0.6	7	6.2
Total	35		84		43		162		113	
Have You Ever Thought Seriously of Moving From Here?										
Yes	31	73.8	64	77.1	27	64.3	122	73.1	69	60.0
No	11	26.2	10	22.9	15	35.7	45	26.9	46	40.0
Total	42		83		42		167		115	

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[a] The N for all columns varies because of missing data.

area--a success rate of 25%. This suggests an increased rate of mobility for this population as compared with the natural outmigration rate from Alabama economic areas of about 10% in this period. In addition, it is almost twice the 13% migration rate of those members of the relocation program who moved successfully without assistance during the period between attempted relocation and interview (31 of the 229 interviewed who were not successfully relocated by the LMDP staff moved on their own).

This success rate compares well with the 33.6% rate reported for the North Carolina project at the end of a one year follow-up.[39] It is less than one half, however, the 53% success rate reported by the 1970-71 Mississippi project, operated by STAR Inc.; but this STAR project had been operating for several years, while the Tuskegee project was in the first two years of its operation.[40] Both the North Carolina and Mississippi LMDP's served relocation populations similar to that of the Tuskegee LMDP, except for degree of skill training.

Our cross-tab analysis results in some surprises concerning the characteristics of the successful relocatees (see summary table 7, p. 43): blacks and women relocated somewhat more successfully than whites and men. The first finding however may be explained by the fact that the program was staffed by blacks. The sex finding reflects the fact that women were generally sent to and subsequently hired in jobs traditionally held by women in the clerical and nursing fields, while the men, most of whom were black, were attempting to break into craft occupations (see Table 8, p. 44).

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[39] Charles K. Fairchild, "Rural Disadvantaged Mobility," Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Spring Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association Series (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1969), p. 468.

[40] John F. Speight, Relocating the Unemployed: Dimensions of Success (Hattiesburg, Mississippi: Mississippi Labor Mobility Project, STAR, Inc., September, 1973), p. xiii.

Other findings were more predictable. Younger members relocated more successfully than older ones and relocation success clearly favored the single person. Family size, education and skill training showed little apparent correlation with relocation success versus failure. Evidence of mobility propensity, as reflected in the selected measures found in Tables 5 and 6, columns 1, 2 and 5, and summarized in Table 7, is conflicting: while relatively fewer of the successful grew up on farms, more of them were living in their home town at time of relocation compared with those who left the relocation area. It is evident as well that a greater percentage of the successfully relocated had lived in only one community prior to relocation versus those who left the relocation area.

TABLE 7

DEMOGRAPHIC, HUMAN CAPITAL AND MOBILITY PROPENSITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE SUB-GROUPS: SUCCESSFUL RELOCATEES, THOSE WHO LEFT RELOCATION AREA, AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP

Characteristic	Successfully Relocated (N=51)		Left Relocation Area (N=101)		Control Group (N=127)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
DEMOGRAPHIC						
Race - Black	40	78.4	73	72.3	69	54.3
White	11	21.6	28	27.7	58	45.7
Sex - Male	38	74.5	91	90.1	111	87.4
Female	13	25.5	10	9.9	16	12.6
Age - 29 or younger	35	68.7	54	53.5	70	55.0
Married	20	39.2	62	61.4	72	56.7
Dependents--4 or more children at home	8	33.3	13	20.6	19	26.8
HUMAN CAPITAL						
Skill Training	34	66.7	65	64.4	98	77.2
Education--12 grades or more	29	58.0	49	48.5	64	50.8
MOBILITY PROPENSITY						
Grew up on farm	24	47.1	54	54.0	58	46.0
Living in hometown	36	70.6	64	64.6	78	61.4
Lived in more than 1 community as civilian	15	34.1	47	50.5	42	39.3
Lived in other communities while in military	6	13.4	26	29.2	18	19.2
Took more than 3 trips greater than 100 miles in previous 5 years	26	55.3	51	53.1	64	64.7
Most relatives live near	32	74.4	56	68.3	74	69.2
Most friends live near	22	62.9	55	65.5	71	62.8
Have thought seriously of moving	31	73.8	64	77.1	69	60.0

TABLE 8

JOB REPORTED TO--ALL ATTEMPTED RELOCATIONS BY SEX

Job Category	Successfully Relocated (N=51)				Left Relocation Area (N=101)				Did Not Take Job (N=50)			
	Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Clerical workers	1	2.7	11	84.6	2	2.2	5	50.0			1	50.0
Craftsmen and foremen (skilled)	26	70.2			63	69.2			28	63.6		
Operatives (semi-skilled)	3	8.1			3	3.3	1	10.0	6	13.6		
Non-farm laborers	4	10.8			19	20.9			10	22.7		
Service workers	3	8.1	2	15.4	4	4.4	4	40.0			1	50.0
Total	37		13		91		10		44		2	

In investigating the question of whether the project improved the direction of migration, we note that the Bureau of the Census reports that two-thirds of all Alabama outmigration in the 1965-70 period was to other states.[41] We would hope that one result of the LMDP would be to relocate workers within the same region and in medium-sized cities which exhibit relatively high labor demand.

The project did generally attempt to relocate its participants to moderately-sized cities, largely in the South, with desirable labor market conditions (see Tables 9, 10 and 11, pp. 47-49)--although fully one third of the attempted relocations were to New York and Illinois. Of the 51 who did relocate successfully, over one half resided at time of interview in the South, with 47% in towns of 250,000 or less. Their counties of residence were highly industrialized, with median incomes in general considerably higher and unemployment rates lower than in the counties in which either the control group or those who left the relocation area were living (see Table 12, and summary table 13, pp. 51 and 52).

The naturally mobile subset of 31 exhibited a more common migration pattern: one half lived more than 500 miles from home, in towns which were over 250,000 in size. While these 31 lived in highly industrialized counties (all with less than 3% employment in agriculture), 55% lived outside the South.

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[41] Calculated from U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Subject Reports, Final Report PC(2)-2E, "Migration Between State Economic Areas" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table 4.

TABLE 9

REGION OF DESTINATION
ALL ATTEMPTED RELOCATIONS

Region	Number	Percent
East South Central	45	22.4
West South Central	10	5.0
South Atlantic	72	35.8
East North Central	45	22.4
Middle Atlantic	29	14.4
Total	201	

TABLE 10

STATE OF DESTINATION
ALL ATTEMPTED RELOCATIONS

State	Number	Percent
East South Central Region		
Alabama	45	22.4
West South Central Region		
Louisiana	10	5.0
South Atlantic Region		
Florida	1	0.5
Georgia	52	25.9
North Carolina	3	1.5
South Carolina	5	2.5
Virginia	11	5.5
East North Central Region		
Illinois	42	20.9
Indiana	2	1.0
Michigan	1	0.5
Middle Atlantic Region		
New Jersey	3	1.5
New York	26	12.9
Total	201	

TABLE 11

REGION AND LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS

	Attempted Relocation (N=202)	Successful Relocation (N=51)
Number and percent relocated within Southern region	127 (63.0%)	28 (54.9%)
Relocation town:		
median distance travelled	300 miles	500 to 699 miles
median population (1970)	100,000 to 249,999	250,000 to 999,999
median growth rate (1960-70)	0 to +5.0%	0 to -5.0%
Relocation county (median):		
employment in agriculture	0 to +3.0%	0 to +3.0%
unemployment rate	2.0 to 2.9%	2.0 to 2.9%
income as a % of 1970 Alabama median income	+130.1 to +150.0%	+130.1 to +150.0%
ratio: unemployment rate as a percent of hometown county unemployment rate	.70 to .89	.70 to .89

Sources for Table 11

Relocation Town Labor Market Characteristics

Population (1970) and growth rate (1960-70):

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Parts 2, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, and 48, Table 6.

Employment in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining as a % of total employed, by county and major city (1970):

Calculated from U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of the Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Parts 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, and 48, Tables 87 and 123.

County unemployment rate in year of relocation:

These data were compiled from the following sources: Juanita Brent, U.S., Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, telephone conversation with author, March 26, 1974; State of Alabama, *Civilian Work Force Estimate, by County: Alabama. March, 1966*; State of Alabama, *Civilian Work Force Estimate, by County: Alabama. March, 1967*; State of Florida, Department of Commerce, Division of Administration, Bureau of Research and Statistics, "Basic Labor Market Information: Bay County" (1972); and U.S., Department of Labor, *Manpower Report of the President, 1973* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), Table D-8.

Relocation county family median income (1970) as a % of 1970 Alabama family median income:

Calculated from U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of the Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 1, Table 186 and Parts 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, and 48, Tables 47 and 127; and U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1962*, Tables 2 and 6.

TABLE 12

PRESENT LOCATION -- BY REGION

Region	Successfully Relocated #	Successfully Relocated %	Left Relocation Area #	Left Relocation Area %	Control #	Control %	Total (N=279) #	Total (N=279) %
East South Central	11	21.6	92	91.1	116	92.1	219	78.8
South Atlantic	17	33.3	1	1.0	1	0.8	19	6.8
East North Central	14	27.5	4	4.0	8	6.3	26	9.4
Middle Atlantic	9	17.6	4	4.0	1	0.8	14	5.0
Total	51		101		126		278	

TABLE 13

LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCATION AT TIME OF INTERVIEW FOR THREE SUB-GROUPS

Characteristics	Successfully Relocated (N=51)		Left Relocation Area (N=101)		Control Group (N=127)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Residence in Southern region	28	54.9	93	92.1	117	92.9
Town size (1970) less than 250,000	24	47.0	89	88.0	117	92.9
County:						
less than 3.0% of total employment in agriculture	47	95.9	54	53.5	84	66.7
unemployment rate 2.9% or less	42	82.4	46	45.5	41	32.5
median income at least 110.0% of Alabama state median income (1970)	43	87.7	31	31.0	23	18.3

Sources for Table 13

Labor Market Characteristics of Location at Time of Interview

City size (1970):

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Parts 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, and 48, Table 6.

Employment in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining as a % of total employed, by county and major city (1970):

Calculated from U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Parts 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, and 48, Tables 87 and 123.

County unemployment rate in year of interview:

Brent, telephone conversation, 1974; State of Alabama, Department of Industrial Relations, Research and Statistics Division, *Civilian Work Force Estimate, by County: Alabama. March, 1968* (Montgomery, Alabama, 1969); State of Florida, *"Basic Labor Market Information* "; and U.S., Department of Labor, *Manpower Report of the President: 1973*, Table D-8.

County family median income (1970) as a % of 1970 Alabama state median family income:

Calculated from U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 1, Table 182, and Parts 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, and 48, Tables 47 and 127; and U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1962*, Tables 2 and 6.

The second hypothesis tested was:

> Relocation reduced the rate of unemployment of the project participants.

The evidence seems clear: 6% of the successfully relocated reported they held no job at time of interview--versus 22.1% of those who left the relocation area and 23.2% of the control group (see Table 14, p. 56). However, what we may be picking up here is the tendency of those in relocation towns who lost their jobs to return home rather than remain unemployed in a new area.

The third hypothesis tested was:

> Relocation improved the quality of employment for the participants, as measured by: a shift out of unskilled occupations (farm worker, laborer, private household worker) and into the more highly paid semi-skilled, skilled and clerical occupations; increased hourly wages; and placement in jobs appropriate to skill training.

We tested changes in the quality dimensions of employment as a result of relocation by comparing the status of the successfully relocated versus that of those who left the relocation area and the control group (see summary table 15, p. 57, and detailed tables 16 to 21, pp. 58-61).

Concerning present occupational status, we found that one half of those either successfully relocated or who left the relocation area who were employed held semi-skilled or skilled jobs--versus 32% of the control group. Only 8.9% of the successful relocatees were working as laborers, versus 28% of those who left and 49% of the control group.

There is little difference in the percentage earning over $2.00 an hour for the first two groups (68.1% versus 63.1%), but only 53.1% of the control group earned that much per hour. In terms of reported yearly income, we do see a difference: almost one half the successfully relocated earned over $5000 during the year prior to interview, versus one fourth or less of those who left the relocation area or those in the control group.

Over half (54.5%) of the successfully relocated were employed at a job for which they had skill training--versus only about one third of those who either left the relocation area or were part of the control group.

While the differences were not as dramatic as we might have hoped, we did find that those who successfully relocated were distributed in the more highly skilled and highly paid occupations and a relatively greater percentage were placed in occupations for which they had received skill training. A comparison of the characteristics of the present versus original labor market for those who relocated successfully does show the dramatic differences in city size, degree of industrialization, unemployment rate and income levels that we would associate with residence in a more desirable labor market (see summary table 22, p. 62).

TABLE

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

	Successfully Relocated		Left Relocation Area		Control Group	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Have job now	47	94.0	74	77.1	96	76.8
No job now	3	6.0	22	22.9	29	23.2
Total	50		96		125	

Table 15

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME CHARACTERISTICS AT TIME OF INTERVIEW FOR THREE SUB-GROUPS

Characteristics	Successfully Relocated (N=51) #	%	Left Relocation Area (N=101) #	%	Control Group (N=127) #	%
Occupation:						
skilled or semi-skilled blue collar	23	51.2	36	50.7	30	32.2
non-farm laborer or farm worker	4	8.9	21	29.6	48	51.7
Hourly earnings greater than $2.00	32	68.1	46	63.1	51	53.1
Yearly earnings, year prior to interview, greater than $5000	24	47.1	24	25.9	26	21.5
Employed in occupation for which worker was trained	18	54.5	17	37.7	29	36.7

TABLE 16

OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INTERVIEW

Job Category	Successfully Relocated		Left Relocation Area		Control		Total (N=279)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Professional and technical	0	0.0	1	1.4	0	0.0	1	0.5
Clerical	10	22.2	1	1.4	7	7.5	18	8.6
Craftsmen and foremen (skilled)	16	35.6	29	40.8	23	24.7	68	32.5
Operatives (semi-skilled)	7	15.6	7	9.9	7	7.5	21	10.0
Non-farm laborers	4	8.9	20	28.2	46	49.5	70	33.5
Service	8	17.8	12	16.9	8	8.6	28	13.4
Farmworkers	0	0.0	1	1.4	2	2.2	3	1.4
Total	45		71		93		209	

TABLE 17

OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INTERVIEW
MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES

Job Category	Successfully Relocated		Left Relocation Area		Control		Total (N=279)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
White Collar	10	22.2	2	2.8	7	7.5	19	9.1
Blue Collar	27	60.0	56	78.9	76	81.7	159	76.1
Service	8	17.8	12	16.9	8	8.6	28	13.4
Farm	0	0.0	1	1.4	2	2.2	3	1.4
Total	45		71		93		209	

TABLE 18

PRESENT HOURLY EARNINGS

Earnings	Successfully Relocated #	Successfully Relocated %	Left Relocation Area #	Left Relocation Area %	Control Group #	Control Group %
Less than $1.00	1	2.1	1	1.4	5	5.2
$1.00-$1.49	2	4.3	8	11.0	14	14.6
$1.50-$1.99	12	25.5	18	24.7	26	27.1
$2.00-$2.49	13	27.7	18	24.7	22	22.9
$2.50 or more	19	40.4	28	38.4	29	30.2
Total	47		73		96	

TABLE 19

PRESENT HOURLY EARNINGS COMPARED WITH RELOCATION JOB HOURLY EARNINGS

	Successfully Relocated #	Successfully Relocated %	Left Relocation Area #	Left Relocation Area %
Higher	36	78.3	34	49.3
Lower	7	15.2	28	[illegible]0.6
Same	3	6.5	7	10.1
Total	46		69	

TABLE 20

YEARLY EARNINGS YEAR PRIOR TO INTERVIEW

Earnings	Successfully Relocated		Left Relocation Area		Control Group	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Under $1,200	1	2.0	9	9.7	23	19.0
$1,200-$2,999	4	7.8	24	25.8	33	27.3
$3,000-$4,999	22	43.1	36	38.7	39	32.2
$5,000-$7,000	19	37.3	18	19.4	23	19.0
Over $7,000	5	9.8	6	6.5	3	2.5
Total	51		93		121	

TABLE 21

WHETHER JOB NOW HELD IS SAME AS JOB TRAINED FOR

	Successfully Relocated		Left Relocation Area		Control Group	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Same	18	54.5	17	37.7	29	36.7
Different	15	45.4	28	66.2	50	63.3
Not trained or unemployed	18		56		48	
Total	51		101		127	

TABLE 22

LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS OF ORIGINAL LOCATION VERSUS LOCATION AT TIME OF INTERVIEW FOR 51 SUCCESSFUL RELOCATEES

Characteristics	Original Location		Location at Time of Interview	
	#	%	#	%
City size less than 250,000 (1970)	50	98.0	24	47.0
Less than 3.0% of total county employment in agriculture (1970)	20	40.0	47	95.9
County unemployment rate 2.9% or less	18	35.3	42	82.4
Median family income at least 110% of Alabama state median family income (1970)	7	14.0	43	87.7

Regression Analysis

Multiple regression analysis, in which the dependent variable was a dummy variable, "successful relocation," generally confirmed the findings of the previous analysis. Successful relocation was defined as staying in the relocation area (N=51). We included in this regression analysis all whom we interviewed who said that they reported to a relocation job: the "successfully relocated (51), those who "left relocation area" (101), and those who "did not take job" (50). We began, therefore, with 202 observations, N.

Twenty-five independent variables listed in Table 23, p. 64, were selected as appropriate regressors, on the basis of our review of economic theory, migration literature and mobility assistance programs. The fourth category of variables, which we call "mobility propensity variables," seems logically appropriate to this analysis, but these variables may well require the analytic skills of a sociologist or social psychologist in order that they might be used and interpreted with maximum effect and understanding.

Note the following characteristics of the selected independent variables:

Demographic and human capital variables

marital status (variable X5: married)--This dummy variable is coded as follows: married = 1 and

TABLE 23

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable Number	Variable Name	Variable Definition	Expected Sign	Comment
DEMOGRAPHIC AND HUMAN CAPITAL				
X2	SEX	1 if male 0 if female	+	
X3	RACE	1 if white 0 if black	+	
X5	MARRIED	1 if married 0 if other	-	
X7	SKILL TR	1 if yes 0 if no	+	This includes government or private skill training.
X14	AGE*	non-dichotomous, measured by year of birth e.g. 17 for 1917	-	
X15	EDUC-1*	1 if some elementary education 0 if no education	-	
X16	EDUC-2*	1 if high school education or beyond 0 if no education or only elementary	+	

TABLE 23--Continued

Variable Number	Variable Name	Variable Definition	Expected Sign	Comment
X23	DEPENDEN	non-dichotomous, number of dependent children living at home	-	
LABOR MARKET VARIABLES				
X11	UH/URELO	non-dichotomous, ratio of unemployment rates of home vs. relocation county	+	
X13	YRELO/YH	non-dichotomous, ratio of median income relocation county/median income home county	+	
X26	POPULATI	non-dichotomous, population in relocation city, measured in thousands	+	
PROGRAM VARIABLES				
X9	HIRED	1 if hired 0 if not hired	+	This is a proxy measure of job availability at the relocation site.
X10	DEPAR VO	1 if departed voluntarily from relocation job 0 if departed involuntarily	+	

TABLE 23--Continued

Variable Number	Variable Name	Variable Definition	Expected Sign	Comment
X12	REFIND	1 if relocatee selected his relocation job 0 if program staff selected relocation job	+	
X24	FUNDING	1 if loan plus grant 0 if grant only	+	
X25	PAY-RELO	non-dichotomous, pay on relocation job, measured in dollars	+	
X27	DISTANCE	non-dichotomous, number of miles from hometown to relocation town	-	
MOBILITY PROPENSITY VARIABLES				
X4	REL-HOME	1 if relocated from town where reared 0 if relocated from town where not reared	-	
X8	FARM	1 if grew up on farm 0 if didn't grow up on farm	-	
X17	CIV COMM*	non-dichotomous, number of communities lived in as a civilian	+	

TABLE 23 --Continued

Variable Number	Variable Name	Variable Definition	Expected Sign	Comment
X18	MIL COMM*	non-dichotomous, number of communities lived in while in military	+	
X19	LONG TRI*	non-dichotomous, number of trips greater than 100 miles taken in previous 5 years	+	
X20	FAMILY*	1 if few or none family in hometown 0 if most or all family in hometown	+	
X21	FRIEND*	1 if few or none friends in hometown 0 if most or all friends in hometown	+	
X22	THOUGHT*	1 if had seriously thought of moving from present location 0 if had not	+	

*Source of these items is the Tuskegee Alabama LMDP file information, as recorded on data cards provided to the DBSR by the LMDP staff.

single, divorced, separated, widowed and don't know = 0. This is a question directly asked each intervieweee, and "don't know" is a possible response, for example, for a barely literate man whose wife is in the process of divorcing him.

education (variable X15: EDUC-1; variable X16: EDUC-2)--These dummy variables are set up to account for three possible education levels: none, elementary only, and high school and beyond. Elementary education is defined as first through eighth grades. High school and more is ninth grade and beyond. EDUC-2 can be used independently of EDUC-1 as an independent variable in the equation, to reflect a grosser dichotomous condition of elementary or less education or some high school or more education.

Labor market variables

home county unemployment rate/relocation county unemployment rate (variable X11: UH/URELO)-- This variable is measured as a ratio of the employment rates of the two counties in the year of relocation. If the ratio is greater than one, the relocation county has a lower relative unemployment rate; if the ratio is less than 1, the home county has the lower rate. Thus, as the ratio increases so should the desirability of the new labor market.

median income in relocation county (1970)/ median income in home town county (1970) (variable X13: YRELO/YH)--This variable is measured as a ratio of the median incomes of the two counties. As the ratio increases, so should the desirability of the new labor market.

Program variables

was relocatee's departure from his relocation job voluntary or involuntary (variable X10: DEPAR VO)--This is a dummy variable, with voluntary = 1 and not voluntary = 0. The original question asked here was "Why did you leave that [relocation] job?" and responses were grouped under job and location dissatisfaction and other, coded "voluntary"; and fired, laid off and anticipated being laid off, coded "involuntary," The factor we're trying to isolate here is whether or not the job in effect ended for the relocatee.

did program fund relocation with a grant plus loan or a grant only (variable X24: FUNDING)--One anticipates that willingness to go into debt in order to relocate indicates a greater degree of risk-taking and implies a greater commitment to the relocation process than the mere acceptance of a grant.

We should note that the data sources differ for the variables cited above and thus the data may be of differing degrees of reliability. All those items marked with an asterisk (*) in Table 23 are taken from data supplied from the files of the Tuskegee LMDP. I consider these data to be the most unreliable because of the evident misunderstanding of the LMDP staff concerning its data collection and research responsibilities, and an occasional remark such as this, found in a LMDP Report:

> In one specific instance, an interviewer-counselor had 23 applicants to interview in four hours. Consequently, the percentage of error and incompleteness on the ES-260 and ES-261 forms [from which our data are derived] was raised. Interviewer-counselors, on limited occasion, allowed applicants to complete the initial interview forms by themselves, an unsatisfactory, but often seemingly necessary emergency measure.[42]

All other demographic, human capital and program data were collected through personal interview and processed by the DBSR. Individual schedules have been verified for internal consistency before use in this report.

When all independent variables were included in the analysis, only 138 of our N of 202 had complete sets of data, and N was therefore reduced to 138 for the regression portion of the analysis. A subset of ten regressors was found to be the most powerful, with an R^2 of .369. (See Table 24, p. 72.) An F-test indicates that the variables in this equation cannot be assumed to have zero coefficients.

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[42] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-03, p. 17.

We know that the independent variables in the subset are jointly significant. We next add the other fifteen of the twenty-five proposed independent variables to see whether they contribute anything more to the predictive power of the subset equation. (See Table 25, p. 73.) $R^2 = .404$.

We find that the F calculated for the additional variables is .98357. F-critical for a 95% confidence interval is approximately 2.12. Thus the F-test indicates that the larger equation fails to contribute significantly to the overall explanatory power of the equation.

Five of the subset variables significant at a critical t-region of 1.98 (the critical value for a 2-tail test) have especially large regression coefficients (properly interpreted as probabilities when the dependent variable is a dummy variable). These selected subset regressors are listed in Table 26.

The perverse sex and race findings were evident in the cross-tab analysis and discussed there. This regression equation says that the probability of successful relocation is reduced by 22% for males and by 19% for whites. However, our equation is characterized by a low

TABLE 24

SUBSET

```
          STD. ERROR OF Y.x       0.36022

                MULTIPLE R        0.60758
                      R-SQ        0.36916
               ADJUSTED R-SQ      0.31943

            DURBIN-WATSON D  0.77870


REGRESSION EQUATION SPECIFICATIONS

                           VARIABLES ENTERED IN EQUATION

   VARIABLES        REGRESSION    STANDARD       PARTIAL   T VALUES
    ENTERED       COEFFICIENTS  DEVIATIONS  CORRELATIONS   ( 127)

INTERCEPT A(Y.X) -0.30898230   0.20758517                  1.4885
 SEX       X( 2) -0.22677802   0.10760162     -0.1838      2.1076
RACE       X( 3) -0.19382195   0.08429781     -0.1999      2.2993
SKILL TR   X( 7)  0.29976787   0.07591112      0.3307      3.9489
 HIRED     X( 9)  0.36169771   0.07332497      0.4010      4.9328
CIV COMM   X(17) -0.05987526   0.02746737     -0.1899      2.1799
MIL COMM   X(18) -0.03391830   0.01666867     -0.1777      2.0349
LONG TRI   X(19)  0.01525108   0.00861180      0.1552      1.7710
FRIENC     X(21)  0.18477913   0.06520044      0.2439      2.8340
THOUGHT    X(22)  0.18344415   0.12456087      0.1296      1.4727
DEPENDEN   X(23)  0.03406771   0.00965121      0.2989      3.5299
```

TABLE 25

FULL REGRESSION EQUATION

REGRESSION EQUATION SPECIFICATIONS

VARIABLES ENTERED IN EQUATION

VARIABLES ENTERED		REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STANDARD DEVIATIONS	PARTIAL CORRELATIONS	T VALUES (112)
INTERCEPT	A(Y.X)	-0.16233121	0.44367326		0.3659
SEX	X(2)	-0.20679778	0.12631972	-0.1529	1.6371
RACE	X(3)	-0.14728586	0.10495401	-0.1315	1.4033
REL-HOME	X(4)	-0.04583441	0.07593714	-0.0569	0.6035
MARRIED	X(5)	0.02878554	0.10053580	0.0270	0.2863
SKILL TR	X(7)	0.27699443	0.08989305	0.2796	3.0814
FARM	X(8)	0.02228652	0.07119263	0.0296	0.3130
HIRED	X(9)	0.36485579	0.08451405	0.3777	4.3171
DEPAR VO	X(10)	0.00423551	0.10258126	0.0039	0.0413
UH/URFLO	X(11)	0.04101655	0.05860742	0.0660	0.6999
REFIND	X(12)	0.07418243	0.08995018	0.0777	0.8247
YEFLO/YH	X(13)	-0.06948184	0.06560575	-0.0996	1.0591
AGE	X(14)	0.00314500	0.00566066	0.0524	0.5556
EDUC-1	X(15)	-0.36211169	0.29858437	-0.1138	1.2127
EDUC-2	X(16)	0.05571629	0.08782848	0.0598	0.6344
CIV COMM	X(17)	-0.06137483	0.03136911	-0.1818	1.9566
MIL COMM	X(18)	-0.02940144	0.01834429	-0.1497	1.6024
LONG TRI	X(19)	0.01417921	0.00930759	0.1425	1.5234
FAMILY	X(20)	-0.06262779	0.07636748	-0.0773	0.8201
FRIEND	X(21)	0.19665174	0.07293369	0.2469	2.6963
THOUGHT	X(22)	0.22915083	0.15060354	0.1423	1.5216
DEPENDEN	X(23)	0.03599965	0.01254710	0.2617	2.8692
FUNDING	X(24)	-0.07114143	0.10928425	-0.0614	0.6510
PAY-RFLO	X(25)	0.01279406	0.05665480	0.0213	0.2258
POPULATI	X(26)	0.00003367	0.00003733	0.0849	0.9018
DISTANCE	X(27)	-0.00001822	0.00013550	-0.0127	0.1344

Durbin-Watson D statistic, suggesting that the error terms are not randomly distributed and therefore that the t-values may be overstated. Since the t-values for both race and sex are not much over 2.00 (with a critical t being 1.98) we ought to be a bit skeptical concerning the above-stated results.

TABLE 26

SELECTED SUBSET REGRESSORS

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficient	t-value
Sex	-0.22	2.10
Race	-0.19	2.29
Few friends in hometown	.18	2.83
Job availability	.36	4.93
Previous skill training	.29	3.94

The absence of friends in the home town area increased the probability of successful relocation by 18%--a reasonable conclusion, but a factor inappropriate to policy control.

The last two powerful predictive variables cited above are subject to policy control: availability of a specific job in which the relocatee was subsequently hired increased the probability of successful relocation by 36%;

and prior skill training, whatever its source, increased that probability by 29%. In the latter variable we are probably picking up such non-quantifiable factors as degree of work discipline and proper attitude toward supervision which an employer can assume to be complements of successful completion of a training course. In addition, it is possible that such training reduced the cost of on-the-job training to the employer, and thus the real cost of hiring these people was subsequently reduced.

More common correlates of migration such as age and education were not significant in the regression analysis.

Finally, we note one possible problem affecting the results of the regression equation and thus its correct interpretation: measurement errors in our variables. For example, in measuring the effect of race on relocation success an analysis of some subtlety would define race in more complex terms, perhaps in terms of gradations of color from light to dark (as in fact has been done in other survey research conducted by the DBSR). For we know that black people of lighter color have been more acceptable to white employers and therefore have been more likely to be hired. Also, the appropriateness of a zero-1 dummy for the dependent variable is subject to question.

Costs

Using figures cited by Fairchild concerning the expenditures made by the Tuskegee LMDP for administration and relocation assistance during the contract years 1965-66 and 1966-67,[43] we find the following: average cost per successful relocation for the first period (14 successes) was $6620; and for the second period (37 successful relocations), $7641. And we note this does not include the pre-relocation training costs for the 85% of the successfully relocated who had received MDTA training. Direct cost per successful relocation is obviously high, and we see that society's human capital investment in the labor market success of these individuals is substantial.

But we must recall that we have here persons whose prior relationship to the labor market was marginal; they supposedly were selected from among those who rarely worked and, when they did, worked for very little income, as farm laborer or day laborer in low-wage, small-town and rural Southern areas.

If one treats the difference between the median income of the successfully relocated and the control group as a measure of social benefits, it would appear to be about $1500 per year. This admittedly crude measure implies a pay-back period of no more than five years, which appears short in view of the labor market disadvantages of the people relocated, the experimental nature of the program, and its apparently chaotic administration.

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[43] Fairchild, Worker Relocation, p. 147.

We must note however that we pick up here a common problem in the cost analysis of relocation--the inseparability of the returns to migration from the returns to other forms of human capital investment. Here our estimate of the returns to relocation is obscured by the possibility that what we are really measuring is the returns to the complementary human capital investment in training characteristic of most of the relocatees. We note this especially in view of the important predictive role given to skill training in the multiple regression analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

The above gives eloquent evidence of the more desirable economic position of those 51 members of the Tuskegee LMDP who successfully relocated in the 1965-67 period. The LMDP did increase the rate of mobility for this small group and redirect that mobility out of the probable natural migration pattern. In addition, it improved the employment rate, the occupational distribution and the income of this group relative to that of the control group and those who returned home.

However, it is important to recall that these 51 represent only 18% of the 279 whom we were able to interview. And that percentage probably overstates the relocation success rate for the 450 the program dealt with in those years, since it was the experience of the DBSR interviewers that those who successfully relocated were easier to find and interview than those who left the relocation job and area. Thus, in view of the fact that the staff reports indicated appropriate attempts to reduce pertinent costs and ensure appropriate benefits, we now ask why this particular LMDP was not more successful in permanently relocating a larger percentage of those with whom it dealt.

Recruitment and selection

The program apparently did not do an adequate job of recruitment and selection appropriate to a relocation program for the disadvantaged, although admittedly such a function is difficult indeed. There were constraints on its recruitment processes in that it was committed to relocate trainees from selected MDTA projects. However, 40 (14.3%) of the 279 we interviewed said they never reported to any job under the auspices of the relocation staff. These people should have been screened out so that effort could have been concentrated on those willing at least to report to a job. In addition, 31 (8 from the group of those who did not report) moved to new labor market areas on their own during the program; it is self-evident that a relocation program should attempt to select for assisted mobility only those who will not move on their own, although it is evident that redirecting the migration of this subgroup would have been desirable.

Job placement

There are two aspects of this crucial service in the relocation process that we properly should analyze: structural difficulties and discretionary difficulties. First, the Tuskegee program was in reality attempting to parallel the activities of the Alabama State Employment Service (ASES), as discussed previously. And in fact, it was trying to be more than a passive recipient and disburser of job openings; rather, it was seeking possible job openings through all manner of investigation. However, apparently insufficient help from the Employment Service and inadequate training of the LMDP staff job developers, who were themselves just learning their job in these years, hindered the successful securing of entry-level or craft jobs for willing relocatees.

Another structural difficulty was that of the relocation funding process. During the 1965-66 period there apparently was a one week lag between job development and provision of relocation allowance, which was much too long in that these largely semi-skilled jobs were easily filled before the relocatee could get there. It was commendable that this lag was cut to two days by the second year of the program operation (1966-67) by substituting relocation assistance by grant only for the grant plus loan method.

In addition, because it was duplicating the services of the ASES as placement service, the LMDP staff also placed workers into jobs within their own job market--a desirable accomplishment but hardly relocation--which further diverted this staff from its relocation function. Thirty-seven of our sample (13.2%) reported they had taken jobs within commuting distance of their home. Because of this (plus the 40 no-shows) we have previously defined the proper relocation sample as 202.

In its operations the staff also displayed some errors in matters over which it had discretion, both in terms of location of jobs and types of jobs. Moves to distant locations, for example Chicago or Poughkeepsie, not only were expensive; they alsc increased the supportive services necessary, the cost of those services, and the risk that a relocatee would return home. Emphasis in the second year on labor markets closer to home was well advised.

Selection of short-term jobs virtually ensured failure for the relocatees involved. Such was the case especially with construction jobs. Integration of a new construction worker into a new labor market requires information concerning the nature of the construction industry and its hiring practices as well as confronting the problem of union membership. It appears that easy placement on temporary non-union jobs was substituted for the hard work needed to place these disadvantaged into the permanent cadre of construction workers.

Successful placement of a worker on a new job is a complex process when dealing with rural people who have had only intermittent job experience. The processes of application and interview, crucial aspects of successful placement, are unknown skills in high unemployment communities. And the issue of proper job behavior is complicated by two factors: the worker is unlikely to be adequately socialized for the regimented, hierarchical industrial situation, and if he is a black man integrating a white work force (as many relocatees seem to have been) he is unlikely to get that informal information often necessary for survival on a job fed to him by co-workers. We have no evidence that the Tuskegee LMDP staff attempted to do this subtle task of integrating worker into workplace.

Finally we must note that of the 202 we interviewed who did report to relocation jobs, 50 did not take those jobs--either because there was no job there or because the job (according to the account of the relocatee) was not as promised. The fact that this program lost 50 (one-fourth) of its possible relocatees the day they reported indicates a crucial point of slippage in the program and is supportive of the evidence reported from other relocation programs that the firm offer of a job seems to be the most crucial element in the relocation process.

Relocation

We are left with 152 who took the relocation job and actually attempted relocation (54.5% of the 279 interviewed). The loan-plus-grant funding process in the first year of the program was overly complicated, with unfortunate delays implicit in it. However, relocatees seemed satisfied with the amount of financial aid they received.

It is generally agreed that supportive services to aid the relocated worker and family settle into their new location are as important as job development itself. Somers reports that "the most successful pilot mobility projects have been those that devoted as much of their staff to the areas of destination as to the areas of departure."[44] What evidence we have concerning the operations of the Tuskegee project in this regard indicates that little was done to help integrate worker and family into the new community. As a result, duration of the job became crucial--and if it ended, or people anticipated that it might end, or if the job was unsatisfactory in some crucial way, they simply came home: 58% of the 101 who returned home did so for job-related reasons versus 22% who reported location dissatisfaction.

And so we summarize that this program exhibited three crucial difficulties:

1. Although the LMDP staff claimed a relocation population of 450, only 202 of the 279 found by DBSR interviewers said they ever reported to a job outside their home town.

2. One-fourth of those presumably willing to relocate, as demonstrated by willingness to report to a job, did not take a job and returned home immediately--

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[44] Gerald G. Somers, Labor Mobility: An Evaluation of Pilot Projects in Michigan and Wisconsin (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Institute, University of Wisconsin, 1972), p. 103.

so many potential relocatees were lost through improper job development.

3. One is tempted to describe the relocation process as "flinging masses of people at jobs in the hope some of them stick." There appears to have been a commendable attempt to place people in jobs, and in jobs appropriate to skill level. But the short-term nature of many jobs and the apparent lack of supportive services resulted in one half the relocatees (101) leaving the relocation area in the period between relocation and interview.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANPOWER POLICY

The procedural lessons learned from this one experimental relocation project in its attempt to relocate newly-trained rural unemployed as well as general rural unemployed seem to be:

It is important to devise methods to screen out those who are not serious about relocation and to attempt to redirect the migration of those who actually are willing to move without assistance.

The job placement function will need to be a complex function, including various methods of socializing the worker into the work situation, when attempting to place the rural disadvantaged into new jobs. In addition, it will require careful selection of probable long-term jobs, so that the worker in a strange labor market is not left to his own job search processes soon after his arrival.

Relocation aid will need to be considerably more than financial. While financial aid may have been an important inducement to relocation, it is clearly not sufficient. The myriad of supportive services necessary to integrate family into community may substantially raise the success rate. For example, the relocatee may be instructed to report to a special employment counselor in the relocation area if he loses his job.

In other words, the conclusions above are supportive of those in other studies of both European and U. S. programs attempting to relocate the rural unemployed.

In addition, however, the results of the regression analysis underscore the importance of two aspects of manpower policy, job availability and skill training, in facilitating successful relocation of these rural unemployed. The firm offer of a job appropriate to skills and expectations increased greatly the probability of successful relocation. This illustrates the crucial function of appropriate selection of the relocation job along with the quick arrival of the worker for whom it is selected.

The probability of successful relocation was also substantially related to prior skill training. We have previously cited the various characteristics which may make a trainee more desirable as an employee: certifiable skill level, demonstrated self-discipline, appropriate attitude toward supervision, reduced on-the-job training costs. For whatever reasons, skill training was important in ensuring successful relocation in the Tuskegee LMDP. What we may have picked up here, however, is greater aggressiveness and tenacity on the part of the selected workers involved: those who sought out and completed training may have become, because of selected personal traits, the more successful relocatees. However, the Tuskegee LMDP staff concluded otherwise. They argue that:

> finding people who are willing to move is quite easy. The most significant limitation to relocation is employability. What rural Alabama needs most is a massive retraining effort.[45]

If we thus view training as a necessary prerequisite for employment of the rural unskilled unemployed, then the role of prior training in successful relocation is clarified. And the importance of training prior to relocation is emphasized.

We add another important insight concerning the potential operation of a relocation program in this country. One suspects that this experimental program was crucially affected by the desire of its administrators to have the yearly grants renewed. It appeared as if they felt the LMDP would be judged "by Washington," and thus renewed, or not, according to the number of relocations accomplished. This both reflected and resulted in a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the LMDP research function. And it resulted also in job placements which were arranged hastily, or were ill-advised: for example, placement on jobs that were clearly short-term. In a manpower relocation program it is possible, therefore, that careful construction of the funding mechanism so as to reward successful long-term relocations might lead to more careful job selection and placement.

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[45] Tuskegee Institute, Final Report of LMDP, No. 87-01-66-05, pp. 35-36.

We note that we have here studied a program operated by a private contactor, Tuskegee Institute, which in some ways paralleled the functions of the ASES. One is tempted to conclude that in the interests of efficiency such a program should in fact be part of a much larger array of manpower services provided by the ASES. But upon reflection, it is this author's conclusion that the primary function performed by Tuskegee Institute, the aggressive placing of blacks into entry jobs traditionally reserved for whites, may well not get done if left to the state agency. The important point here may be the integration of Tuskegee's placement role into the system of manpower services available in Alabama, not the relinquishing of it to the state. And one might generalize here concerning other minorities in other areas: perhaps their needs, whether local placement or regional relocation, might best be met by an independent agency uniquely sensitive to their needs yet integrated into the relevant manpower services delivery system.

Which brings us to the current state of manpower policy and programs in the United States. As reported in the 1974 Manpower Report, we are in a period of transition as governors and chief elected officials of major cities and counties take over responsibility for selecting, planning and operating the mix of manpower services to be made available in their area--this a result of CETA, the

Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973.[46] The rationale is decentralization and increased responsiveness to local needs. In the view of some observers it raises the strong possibility that local political pressures will subordinate the interests of the disadvantaged even more than have federally controlled programs.[47]

It is unlikely that the above suggestion that independent agencies be funded to deal with special manpower relocation problems will, under revenue sharing, even be entertained. Regarding any possible state-provided relocation aid: since it has proved to be desirable that relocation for the semi-skilled be to the medium-sized growing cities within the same state or region, relocation could be a desirable and useful tool under this decentralized system. However, some labor markets really are national, for example for professionals; one anticipates no integrated national manpower network to aid this type of unemployment and relocation.

In addition, a note concerning equity. Peirce argues that "even if a perfect test could be devised to distinguish those who would move anyway from those who require a subsidy, it is inequitable to subsidize only the

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[46] U.S., Department of Labor, Manpower Report of the President: 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 37 *passim*.

[47] See, for example, Lloyd Ulman, "The Uses and Limits of Manpower Policy," The Public Interest, XXXIV (Winter, 1974), p. 105.

moves of the latter."[48] It is important, I think, to recall that we do subsidize the moves of those who have access to extensive labor market information and the resources to move. That is, the geographic mobility of that segment of the population which is most mobile and is most savvy concerning tax laws is subsidized via tax deductions. Perhaps equity requires that we extend similar subsidies to all job-related moves. It is this author's preference, however, that we eliminate the tax deduction, utilized no doubt more often by the higher income groups for whom it is a pure rent, in other words, a benefit that does not influence the decision to move. The additional tax revenue could be used to subsidize and provide the appropriate supportive services for those who, without such help, would remain hidden, unemployed and unproductive.

Finally, we note that this analysis has assumed a labor market model in which the labor force activity of the unemployed and disadvantaged, both participation and mobility, would respond to traditional market incentives. It is probable that there are members of the labor force whose responsiveness has been damaged by previous forays into hostile labor markets. However, there is evidence, as Ulman argues, that:

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[48] William S. Peirce, "Comment on Development of Relocation Allowances as Manpower Policy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XX, No. 3 (1967), 454.

> The so-called work ethic still dominates, and it is held strongly not only by the white tax-paying middle classes but by the underprivileged and the poor themselves, who want intensely to enhance their sense of worth along with their incomes.[49]

This analysis also assumes that macroeconomic policies acting upon an economy with permissive structural characteristics (in other words, a fairly benign Phillips curve) will result in job vacancies such that relocatees will not be merely displacing relocation area labor market members from their jobs. However, the current indications that part of the structural problem in the United States is a shortage of capital suggest that the job creation function of traditional macroeconomic policies will be restrained for some time to come.

Also, this analysis largely ignores the persistence of discrimination in the labor market which effects barriers to all forms of labor mobility, barriers against which traditional manpower policies (aimed at enhancing mobility) are a poor weapon.

So we must note that relocation, as any manpower policy, may be most usefully viewed not as an alternative but rather as a complement to other necessary economic policies: regional economic development, price and wage restraint, enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation, and direct transfers to the poor. Actually, one might say it this way: attempts to make the working of the market more efficient through mobility-enhancing manpower programs may now have to yield to necessary direct market intervention.

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[49] Ulman, "Uses of Manpower Policy," p. 104.

However, we can conclude that our study of the Tuskegee Institute experience with labor relocation suggests that relocation subsidies, when appropriate, could successfully provide marginal but useful aid in speeding the geographic labor mobility of the reluctant and in redirecting that mobility which is contrary to the general welfare. And in so doing, this manpower tool can, we expect, improve the economic welfare of the unemployed individual while enhancing the productive capacity of the economy.

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